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SECTION 303 OF THE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL
RELIEF ACT
JAMS THOMAS CONNOR*
A good deal has been written concerning the present
Civil Relief Act' and its prototype, the 1918 Act.2  It is not
the intention of this article to undertake another excursion
along avenues already well explored .3  Rather, attention here
will be focused on that part of the Act which is contained
in Section 303. Two weighty reasons justify this concentra-
tion of interest. First of all, Section 303 is an innovation.4
It is not found in the 1918 Act.5 Secondly, the tremendous
development in deferred-payment purchases of motor ve-
hicles and accessories during the past two decades indicates
that Section 303, confined as it is to this situation, will be
resorted to constantly in the administration of this mora-
*Dean and Professor of law, Loyola University, New Orleans, some-
time Chief of the Legal Division, Louisiana Selective Service Sys-
tem as a Captain in the Judge Advocate General's Department.
The views expressed herein are personal to the writer and should
not be construed in any sense as official statements.
154 STAT. 1178 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. p. 112 (Supp. 1941).
240 STAT. 440 (1918), 50 U.S.C-. p. 178 (1928).
3 As to the 1918 Act, See Ferry, Rosenbaum, & Wigmore, History of
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (1918) 3 mASS. L.Q.
204; Ferry, Rosenbaum, & Wigmore, Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Rights Bill (1918) 12 ILL. L. na-. 449; Notes (1918) 3 MASS.L.Q.
230, 4 MAss.L.Q. 24.
For a discussion of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Act of
1940, See Bendetson, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940 (1940) 2 w. & i. L. REV. 1; Muench, Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act of 1940 (1940) 6 JOHN MARSEALL L.Q. 190; Cockrill, Sol-
diers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (1941) 27 A.B.A.J. 23;
Crane, Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940 (1941) 7 u. Or
PITT. L. nay. 300; Kuhns, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of 1940 (1941) 20 NEBR.L.REV. 357; Rogers, The Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940 (1941) 29 GEo. i. J. 748; Taintor & Butts,
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (1941) 13 MISS.L.S.
467.
4 As a matter of fact, the present Act when introduced by Senator
Overton of Louisiana did not contain § 303. (See S. 4270,
76th Cong., 3d Sess.). The subject matter of § 303 was con-
tained in a House Amendment to the original Senate Bill. [See
Conference Report, H.R.REP. iNO. 3030, 76th Cong., 3d Sess, (1940)
51.]
5There was no counterpart in the 1918 Act to the subject matter of
the present Section 303. 54 STAT. 1183 (1940), 50 u.S.c.A. §533
(Supp. 1941).
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torium statute.6 It is the purpose of this paper therefore
to examine this section in detail and to explore all of its
significant aspects in an effort to arrive at sound and de-
fensible conclusions with respect to its function, scope, and
application.
Sec. 303. No court shall stay a proceeding to resume possession of a
motor vehicle, tractor, or the accessories of either, or for an order of
sale thereof, where said motor vehicle, tractor, or accessories are en-
cumbered by a purchase money mortgage, conditional sales contract, or
a lease or bailment with a view to purchase, unless the court shall find
that 50 per centum or more of the purchase price of said property
has been paid, but in any such proceeding the court may, before enter-
ing an order or judgment, require the plaintiff to file a bond, approved
by the court, conditioned to indemnify the defendant, if in military
service, against any loss or damage that he may suffer by reason of
any such judgment or order should the judgment or order be set aside
in whole or in part.
"50 per centum . . . of the purchase price"
The first matter to be determined in the application of
Section 303 is whether 50 per centum or more of the pur-
chase price has been paid, since unless it has been, this section
is unavailing to the defendant in a proceeding to resume pos-
session. For the reason that the typical installment pur-
chase is shrouded in euphemistic language and is presented
to the purchaser with a liberal application of "sugar", a de-
tailed analysis of a standard agreement will contribute to
a better understanding. Let us suppose, for example, that
the total retail price of the motor vehicle is $1158.00. An
allowance of $358. is made on the purchaser's old car, leaving
a net total due of $800.00. Usually, the creditor represents
that its interest rate is only 6 per centum on the unpaid bal-
ance. The unwary purchaser may not realize of course that
the total interest for the period of the contract is reckoned
on the original unpaid balance whereas by each installment
he is reducing the principal with the result that actual inter-
est more nearly approximates 12 per centum on the entire
transaction. Be that as it may, the purchaser is usually think-
ing about the amount of the installment due each month and
how he will meet it, rather than of the refinements of high
6The truth of this prediction can be attested from the personal ex-
perience of the writer who,-during the first year of this Act's oper-
ation, was called upon countless times in his capacity as Chief of
the Legal Division, Louisiana Selective Service System, to advise
inductees concerning their "bought on time" automobiles.
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finance. In the example selected he will find that the month-
ly payment will be $52.53 for a period of eighteen months.
Breaking this down we find that $4.00 of this sum represents
interest (based on 6 per centum of the unpaid balance of
$800.00) and $4.09 represents "carrying charges" (insurance,
etc.). It is apparent then that each month $44.44 is in re-
duction of principal. When it is recalled that the original
purchase price was $1158.00 and $358.00 was allowed on
the old car, it appears that $221.00 will have to be paid on
the principal in order to reach 50 per centum of the purchase
price or $579.00. Thus this purchaser will have come within
the intendment of section 303 when he has paid his fifth in-
stallment which will represent a payment at that time of
$222.20 on principal. From the foregoing it is evident that
the precise terms of each installment contract will have to
be examined and a "break down" made in order to determine
when the minimum of 50 per centum on the purchase price
has been paid. And it must be remembered that the "purch-
ase price" must be taken as the base and not the net balance
due after the "trade-in" allowance.
"encumbered by a purchase money mortgage"
This innocent looking phrase may at first blush seem
to have implicit in it one of the most perplexing legal prob-
lems which will arise under the section. The usual purchase-
money mortgage is a well understood device. In its simplest
form it constitutes an encumbrance in favor of the seller
upon the subject-matter of the sale to secure the unpaid bal-
ance due to the seller on the contract.7 So long as the trans-
action remains a two-party, seller-purchaser, mortgagee-
mortgagor agreement, no special difficulty need be antici-
pated. When we consider motor vehicle and tractor financ-
ing it has been developed, however, striking possibilities
present themselves. It is generally known that the auto-
mobile dealer (the seller) immediately sells the security (the
note plus purchase-money mortgage) as soon as it is executed
by the purchaser. The standard practice is to have the pur-
chaser execute an ordinary chattel mortgage or conditional
sales agreement to secure payment of a note payable to the
order of the dealer and calling for the payment of stated
installments on the purchase price. The dealer immediately
7 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1462.
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indorses the note, with or without recourse, forwards
it and the chattel mortgage to his finance company or
bank and simultaneously draws a sight draft on the in-
dorsee for the full principal balance due and secured by
the mortgage. The interesting question now presents it-
self whether, as between the indorsee who is a holder in
due course of the note and the purchaser of the motor ve-
hicle, the security still remains a purchase-money mortgage.
And it is important! For if it is not a purchase-money mort-
gage in the hands of the holder in due course, but simply
"other security in the nature of a mortgage... ",, the latter
may well contend that even though the purchaser has paid
more than 50 per centum of the purchase price, the matter of
legal relief in case of default should be adjudicated under
section 302 rather than 303. The significance of this con-
tention becomes apparent when it is remembered that section
303 specifically mandates the court to grant a stay of re-
possession if it finds that 50 per centum of the purchase
price has been paid whereas under section 302 the court may
either grant a stay or "make such other disposition of the
case as may be equitable to conserve the interests of all part-
ies".9 Having gained this point, i.e., that section 302 rather
than 303 should be applied, it is possible for the creditor
to argue with touching eloquence and with considerable per-
suasiveness that it is far better to permit the repossession of
the motor vehicle and sell it for the account of the purchaser
8§ 302(1). 54 STAT. 1182 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. §532 (1) (Supp. 1941).
954 STAT. 1182 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. § 532 (Supp. 1941). "See. 302.
(1) The provisions of this section shall apply only to obliga-
tions originating prior to the date of approval of this Act
and secured by mortgage trust deed, or other security in the
nature of a mortgage upon real or personal property owned by a
person in military service at the commencement of the period of the
military service and still so owned by him. (2) In any proceeding
commenced in any court during the period of military service to en-
force such obligation arising out of nonpayment of any sum there-
under due or out of any other breach of the terms thereof occur-
ning prior to or during the period of such service the court may,
after hearing, in its discretion, on its own motion, and shall, except
as provided in section 303, on application to it by such person in
military service or some person on his behalf, unless in the opinion
of the court the ability of the defendant to comply with the terms
of the obligation is not materially affected by reason of his military
service--(a) stay the proceedings as provided in this Act; or (b)
make such other disposition of the case as may be equitable to
conserve the interests of all parties. (3) No sale under a power
of sale or under a judgment entered upon warrant of attorney to
confess judgment contained in any such obligation shall be valid if
made during the period of military service or within three months
thereafter, unless upon an order of sale previously granted by the
court and a return thereto made and approved by the court."
[Vol. 17
1942) SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT 289
than to have it stored away or worn out by use during the
period of immunity from the obligation of the payments,
thus diminishing the value of the security. Nor is the inter-
est of the creditor in maintaining the value of its security
the only persuasive factor. There is little comfort in store
for the purchaser whether he stores the automobile or uses
it. In either case it depreciates rapidly. In the meantime
the unpaid and over-due but un-collectable installments mount
apace and, according to the terms of the Act, the immunity
created by it terminates three months after the completion
of military service.10 Thus the purchaser may find himself
with neither the "game or a name". Who is to say that
the creditor is not rendering the person in military service a
distinct service by re-possessing the motor vehicle or tractor
and disposing of it for his account? And what will it profit
a person to return to civil life only to have a deficiency judg-
ment executable against him within ninety days-a judg-
ment which in all probability he will be unable to pay !"1
Let us examine the problem which has been posed. It is
worthy of attention that, whereas section 303 speaks of a
"purchase-money mortgage", the language of section 302 is
"or other security in the nature of a mortgage .... " Fur-
thermore, section 30112, which deals necessarily with condi-
tional sales agreements, leaves no opportunity for a dubious
construction since it includes not only the original seller but
also the assignee of the seller, thus making it abundantly
clear that whoever figures in the security as a creditor must
resort to judicial proceedings in order to exercise any option
to rescind or terminate the contract and resume possession
of the property. Is it permissible to conclude therefore that
the Congress intended to attach a special limitation to section
10 § 204. 54 STAT. 1181 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. §524 (Supp. 1941).
11 This very argument was urged in a repossession case in which the
author of this article appeared as amicus curae.
12 54 STAT. 1182 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. §531 (Supp. 1941). "See. 301
(1) No person who prior to the date of approval of this Act
has received, or whose assignor has received, under a contract for
the purchase of real or personal property, or of lease or bailment
with a view to purchase of such property, a deposit or installment
of the purchase price from a person or from the assignor of a
person who, after the date of payment of such deposit or install-
ment, has entered military service, shall exercise any right or option
under such contract to rescind or terminate the contract or resume
possession of the property for non-payment of any installment fall-
ing due during the period of such military service, except by action
in a court of competent jurisdiction. . .. I
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303 by the phrase "purchase-money mortgage"? An ex-
amination of sections 301, 302, and 303 of the Act strongly
suggests the conclusion that the Congress was addressing it-
self to the general problem of "debtor with equity and in-
cumbrance" and intended by section 303 to be decisive in the
result to be achieved at least to the extent that there shall
be no re-possession when the debtor's equity, amounted to
50 per centum or more and the matter involved a motor ve-
hicle, tractor, or the accessories thereof.'3 On the matter
of legislative intent it is elementary however that unless a
statute includes a specific situation within its intendment by
appropriate language, it cannot be applied to the situation no
matter how desirable the inclusion may seem to be from the
point of view of the judge.'4 Were it not for the possibility
of a strict and literal construction, there seems to be very
little doubt that the creditor is a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument and the chattel mortgage might be lik-
ened to a trust deed of real estate to the extent that it rep-
resents security for the benefit of the holder of the note
whoever he may be at the date of maturity.5 Or to take the
more realistic (functional) view, the mortgage is evidence of
a lien to secure payment and nothing more.16 Certainly, from
the viewpoint of the debtor, the payments made are in re-
duction of the debt for which the security was given and this
is what occurs no matter who is the legal owner of the note
representing the debt. Thus it would not seem to be of
the essence of a "purchase-money mortgage" that the original
creditor retain the security and the evidence of the debt.
Aside from the foregoing theoretical analysis of the
situation, there is a very practical reason why this phase of
the problem may never seriously trouble the courts. The
"3 See Conference Report, H. R. REP. NO. 3030, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)
51.
14 See Kent v. Rothensies, 120 F. (2d) 476 (E. D. Pa. 1941) and
Fleming v. Belo Corporation, 121 F. (2d) 201 (N.D.Tex. 1941).
35 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) §1400.
6 Hannah and Hogg v. Richter Brewing Company et al., 149 Mich. 220,
112 N.W. 713 (1907). In discussing the nature of a chattel mort-
gage, the court speaking through McAlvay, C. J., stated: "While
many of the courts hold to the common law doctrine that a chattel
mortgage is an instrument of sale conveying the title of the prop-
erty, this court has held that the true relation of the parties to a
chattel mortgage is that of debtor on one side and creditor secured
by lien on the other", citing Lucking v. Wesson, 25 Mich. 443. See
the interesting discussion by Glenn, The Chattel Mortgage as a
Statutory Security (1939) 25 VA. L. REV. 316.
[Vol. 17290
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argument thus far advanced to favor the application of sec-
tion 302 rather than 303 on the assumption that the security
no longer remains a purchase-money mortgage when it
has been negotiated is specious. It is a double-edged sword!
For if section 302 should be applied when the security
has been negotiated for the reason that it is no longer
a purchase-money mortgage, it should be applied regardless
of the amount of the purchaser's equity. Thus the owner
of the security would lose the benefit of the positive in-
junction contained in section 303 that no stay of repossession
shall be granted if less than 50 per centum of the purchase
price has been paid. When this fact is fully realized by the
holder in due course of the security, it is safe to assume that
he will not urge this construction.
There is a more serious consideration implicit in the
contention however. If the creditor who has purchased the
security can convince the court that section 302 is the ap-
propriate section to be applied, he will have set at rest the
question whether section 303 is to be applied to purchases
subsequent to the effective date of the Act. Section 302 is
limited in haec verba to obligations originating prior to the
date of the approval of the Act. (October 17, 1940) This
phase of the problem will be discussed presently.
"No court shall stay a proceeding"
It is interesting to note that section 301 of the Act ap-
plies only to cases in which there has been received a deposit
or installment of the purchase price by the creditor prior to
the date of the approval of the Act (October 17, 1940). Sec-
tion 302 specifically states that it shall apply only to obliga-
tions prior to the date of the approval of the Act. Both of
these sections refer to section 303 by way of exception. It
remains to be determined then whether a similar limitation is
imposed upon the court in the application of section 303.
Nowhere in the section does one find any language to indicate
that it is to be applied only to obligations originating prior
to the effective date of the Act. Yet if 303 is to be considered
in pari materia with sections 301 and 302, there is ground for
alleging that its operation is to be confined to agreements
entered into prior to October 17, 1940. Some practical con-
siderations lead to the same conclusion since if the immunity
from repossession created in favor of the purchaser whose
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
equity in the motor vehicle is 50 per centum or greater is to
be extended to purchasers who contract subsequent to the
effective date of the Act, considerable injustice is done to
the creditor. One answer of course, is that the creditor is
free to refrain from accepting the contract. And it must
always be kept in mind that the entire Act is essentially a
moratorium and is not intended to be a defense to liability
on obligations fairly assumed. Nevertheless, the rapidly de-
preciable character of the security in this situation offers
little encouragement to the creditor if he is forced to wait an
indefinite time before he can collect up to 50 per centum of
his claim. Aside from a literal construction of the Act, the
decision whether 303 is to be confined to obligations originat-
ing prior to October 17, 1940, will bring into focus the rela-
tive desirability of inducing creditors (finance companies) to
extend credit to purchasers of motor vehicles subsequent to
this date or of affording an indefinite moratorium to a per-
son in the military service who has at least a 50 per centum
equity in the automobile or tractor regardless of the time of
the purchase. It is regrettable that the matter has been left
to conjecture.
To return to a consideration of the terms of the section,
a fair reading forces the conclusion that 303 is to apply
regardless of the date of the original contract. The situa-
tions envisaged in sections 301 and 302 make it abundantly
clear that were these sections not confined to agreements (or
payments) made prior to the date of approval, a great
temptation would have been created to undertake improvi-
dent installment purchases by those who anticipated entrance
into military service.17 The example of the Insurance Article
of the Act'18 which confined its benefits to contracts which
were made and a premium paid before the date of approval
of the Act or not less than thirty days before entry into the
military service is in point. The writer knows that insurance
companies did a "land office" business by virtue of the
"thirty days before entry into the military service" grace
period, especially among National Guardsmen who were given
more than thirty days notice of their activation. It is safe
to predict that a large percentage of these policies will be
1'See the comment of Bendetson, A Discussion of the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (1940) 2 w. & r,. L. REv. 1, 82, 33.
28 § 402. 54STAT. 1183 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. § 542 (Supp. 1941).
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allowed to lapse after the insured returns to civil life and
must repay all back premiums to the Government in order
to continue the policy in force. 9 The same result could have
been anticipated under sections 301 and 302 were their
operations not confined to previous obligations. Turning to
303 the same considerations do not weight so heavily. By its
terms if the purchaser does not have a 50 per centum equity
he stands to have the motor vehicle or tractor repossessed.
If he does have a 50 per centum interest he is protected from
repossession and the creditor may be forced to wait for his
balance. The natural restraint imposed by these factors justi-
fies a distinction in applying the various sections under con-
sideration. The better view would seem to be then that section
303 was not intended to be limited only to purchases of
motor vehicles and tractors made prior to October 17, 1940,
that is, if the argument previously examined relative to
"purchase-money mortgages" does not force a different result
in the case of purchasers of this security.
There is a final matter posed by the phrase "No court
shall stay a proceeding to resume possession of a motor ve-
hicle ...... " It has been pointed out heretofore that both sec-
tions 301 and 302 refer to-section 303 by way of exception
to their applications. It should be emphasized therefore that
section 303 relates only to a proceeding to resume possession.
It is provided that such a proceeding shall not be stayed in
the special case of motor vehicles, tractors and their access-
ories unless 50 per centum of the purchase price has been
paid. In the situation contemplated by sections 301 (con-
ditional sales) and 302 (mortgages, trust deeds, or other
security in the nature of a mortgage on real or personal
property) a stay may be granted regardless of the equity of
the debtor. One may inquire what relief if any is available
to the creditor under the Act in those cases where 50 per
centum or more has been paid on the purchase price. It has
been suggested"0 that the court still has authority to "make
such other disposition of the case as may be equitable to con-
serve the interests of all parties". This is undoubtedly true
as to obligations originating prior to the date of approval
of the Act but if section 303 is construed to apply to pur-
19 § 410. 54 STAT. 1185 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. § 551 (Supp. 1941).
20 Bendetson, A Discussion of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of 1940 (1940) 2 W. & L.L. REV. 1, 12.
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chases of motor vehicles and tractors regardless of the date
of the contract there will be a definite hiatus into which will
fall those transactions dating after October 17, 1940. If 50
per centum of the purchase price has been paid a proceeding
to repossess must be stayed (section 303) but the alternative
disposition (sic) provided in section 302 is unavailable be-
cause the agreement was entered into subsequent to the date
of approval of the Act. Of course, it is entirely possible
that section 20421 under Article II of the Act dealing with
General Relief will be invoked in this situation. One must
never lose sight of the fact, however, that repossession is the
element of the contract primarily relied upon as an induce-
ment to the creditor to negotiate. To deny this remedy
therefore, leaves the creditor little solace when he seeks from
the court such other disposition of the case as may be equit-
able to conserve the interests of all parties. So far as the
creditor is concerned, the only equitable way in which to
conserve not only his interest but that of the purchaser, is
to repossess the motor vehicle in any case of default and in-
ability to pay and have it sold for the account of the purch-
aser. It is evident that the economic considerations involved
here are of far-reaching effect.
Conclusion
At the time this is written, no illumination has been cast
by judicial interpretations upon the problems discussed here-
in. As was observed previously, section 303 has no counter-
part in the 1918 Act. Thus no assistance can be secured from
that source. It is felt however that the courts in administer-
ing section 303 will indulge in a literal construction. This
means that its application will not be confined to trans-
actions originating prior to the effective date of the Act and
to this extent, the section will not be considered in pari
materia with sections 301 and 302.
Something ought to be said in conclusion about two
rather serious short-comings in the Act which stem from a
2154 STAT. 1181 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. § 524 (Supp. 1941). "See. 204.
Any stay of any action, proceeding, attachment, or execution,
ordered by any court under the provisions of this Act may, except
as otherwise provided, be ordered for the period of military service
and three months thereafter or any part of such period, and sub-
ject to such terms as may be just, whether as to payment in install-
ments of such amounts and at such times as the court may fix or
otherwise. .... "
[Vol. IT.
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consideration of section 303. First of all, in those cases
where repossession is authorized (less than 50 per centum
equity in the purchaser) no provision is made for an equi-
table composition of the purchaser's interest. It may be that
in most instances the amount paid at the time of default just
about fairly compensates for the use and consequent de-
preciation. This may not always be the case and so pro-
vision ought to have been made authorizing the court to de-
mand as a condition to granting an order of seizure, a just
reimbursement to the purchaser for any sum paid in over and
above the fair use value of the vehicle while in his possession.
Furthermore, the failure to provide for this disposition of
the situation will undoubtedly result in the creditor re-
possessing the vehicle and selling it for the account of the
original purchaser and assessing a deficiency against him if
the transaction is not fully liquidated in the resale. Para-
graph (3) of 301 will not avail the defendant in this pro-
ceeding.22 This would be an unwarranted (it would seem)
advantage to the creditor and provision ought to be made
authorizing the court to make a final and conclusive disposi-
tion of the issue in all cases where repossession is authorized
and required.
Another deficiency in the Act is its failure to give suf-
ficient attention to its end effect. While it is true that no
penalties may accrue2 3 still the Ac4 limits its moratorium
immunity to the period of military service and sixty or ninety
days thereafter, as the case may be. Thus the laudable pur-
pose of the Act may become a boomrang and its ultimate
effect an iniquitous burden upon persons who have com-
pleted their military service. For example, the installment
payments on a motor vehicle may be suspended during the pe-
riod of military service. During this time however the period
contemplated by the contract for the total payments may have
passed. Their payment has been suspended. All stated pay-
ments have accrued. Suddenly the full amount becomes col-
lectable when the immunity of the statute is removed. Wis-
dom would dictate that provision be made for a resumption
of the payments after a return to civil life in the same
22 Section 301 (3) is confined to hearings on actions growing out of con-
ditional sales, etc., upon which a deposit or installment of the pur-
chase price has been paid prior to the date of approval of the Act.
23 § 202. 54 sTAT. 1181 (1940), 50 U.S.C.A. § 522 (Supp. 1941).
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fashion as they were intended to be made at the time they
were interrupted.24 In this manner the problem of the debtor
is eased at a time when he is confronted with many difficulties
of readjustment. Obviously there is yet time to correct the
short-comings just discussed.
One cannot but admit a feeling of regret that. legislation
so far reaching in its social, economic, and moral effects
did not receive more careful attention during times of tran-
quility in order that its purpose might be understood against
the background of contemporary economic and financial prac-
tices and its objectives secured in a clear and comprehensible
manner.
24 It is felt that sec. 204 does not accomplish this since this section seems
to confine the discretion of the judge to decree payments in in-
stallments or otherwise to the period of military service and three
months thereafter. It is at the end of this period and subsequently
that the relief is needed.
